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Introduction
T his analysis examines accountable care organiza-tions (ACOs) and assesses their implications forantitrust policy. Consideration of the antitrust im-
plications of ACOs is timely. Both the House and Sen-
ate health reform measures contemplate the creation of
ACOs as a new class of Medicare provider while provid-
ing parallel legal authority under Medicaid. It also is
possible that using existing law, the Obama administra-
tion might launch ACOs on a pilot demonstration ba-
sis.1
We begin with a brief overview of the ACO concept
and describe legislative proposals to establish ACOs as
a formal Medicare and Medicaid provider class subject
to special payment rules. We then examine antitrust
policy as it relates to clinical and financial integration in
health care and consider how antitrust principles might
facilitate the formation and operation of ACOs.
Background: ACOs in a Policy Context
Most observers agree that the fractured and frag-
mented state of American health care is both a cause of
poor quality and inefficient care as well as a barrier to
improvement. For almost 90 years, advocates of system
reform called for greater clinical and financial integra-
tion. Early pioneering efforts by both health care pro-
viders and group health purchasers to stimulate the
growth of prepaid group practice produced enduring
examples of system integration such as the Group
Health Cooperative and Kaiser Permanente.2
But while these notable examples have survived into
the modern era, they tend to be the exception rather
than the rule, as powerful medical and hospital inter-
ests have utilized a range of strategies including at-
tempted group boycotts,3 passage of anti- ‘‘corporate
practice of medicine’’ laws, and outright control over
public and private insurance payment policies that
would continue to reward financial and organizational
autonomy and control.4 Many of these strategies rested
on the assertion that system integration inevitably will
place industrial forces in between physicians and their
patients, thereby fundamentally damaging this relation-
ship.
As a result, medical care has remained remarkably
fragmented, even in the face of mounting evidence re-
garding the adverse impact of practice isolation on
1 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modern-
ization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646 (2003).
2 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medi-
cine (Basic Books, 1982) pp. 261-267.
3 American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S.
519 (1943).
4 Rand Rosenblatt, Sylvia Law, and Sara Rosenbaum, Law
and the American Health Care System (Foundation Press,
1997) Chapter 2 (H).
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health care quality, patient safety, and cost. Despite
passage of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973, whose purpose was to incentivize integration,
along with the managed care movement of the 1990s,
much of the health care system continues to operate in
isolation,5 burdened by uncontrolled volume, lack of
treatment integration, inability to generate and report
on the processes and outcomes of care, and a lack of co-
ordination between medical treatment on the one hand
and public health, educational, and social interventions
on the other. Although considerable literature docu-
ments the quality and efficiency effects of clinical inte-
gration,6 two-thirds of all physicians continue to prac-
tice in groups of 50 or fewer, and one-third work either
solo or in a practice of two.7
The most recent health reform debate has once again
raised these same issues. This heightened focus on in-
tegration has been spurred on by the 2009 enactment of
the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (HITECH),8 whose purpose is to
achieve widespread adoption and meaningful use of the
type of information technology deemed integral to bet-
ter care integration.
Unlike HMOs or managed care, this latest round of
reform is focused on achieving a bottoms-up change in
health care practice, rather than a top down integration
of practice arrangements into hybrid entities that insure
what they furnish. This effort at change appears to be
more directly focused on the organization and structure
of health care delivery itself, regardless of whether
health care systems, once transformed, ultimately be-
come vertically integrated into insured or administered
financial arrangements.
In keeping with this search for yet another new path-
way toward reform, numerous experts have developed
the concept of an ‘‘accountable care organization
(ACO)’’9 and have called for the incentivization of these
new entities through changes in Medicare payment
policies aimed at recognizing and financially rewarding
this new type of provider class. Of course, through li-
censure powers, states could undertake a similar effort
to spur the creation of integrated care entities, but the
advantage of embedding this type of organizational
creature in Medicare and Medicaid is the ability to align
operational and payment reforms while stimulating
similar actions on the part of private payers. The cre-
ation of ACOs as a matter of Medicare policy also could
have the advantage of transforming the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) into an active
purchaser of integrated health care rather than a simple
claims payer under Medicare Parts A and B or certifier
of Medicare Advantage (MA) organizations, whose
quality and cost limitations have attracted considerable
public attention in recent years.10
Reflecting these recommendations, the congression-
ally established Medicare Payment Advisory Commis-
sion (MedPAC), in its 2009 Report to Congress,11 rec-
ommended the legislative establishment of a new pro-
vider class consisting of clinically and financially
integrated health care entities with which CMS would
directly contract for care rather than depending on sys-
tem reform through MA intermediaries. MedPAC de-
fined an ACO12 as a group of physicians (possibly in-
cluding a hospital) that assumes responsibility for an-
nual Medicare spending for a defined patient
population. MedPAC noted that ACOs could be com-
pensated for patient care through various payment
mechanisms. One model might be a case-based pay-
ment mechanism that, much like the Medicare PPS sys-
tem for hospitals, bundles procedures into a case-based
payment structure that incentivizes greater clinical and
financial integration in order to reduce costs and im-
prove quality.13 An alternative payment approach in the
5 A particularly vivid portrayal of this landscape and its con-
sequences in some health care markets can be seen in a semi-
nal 2009 article by Dr. Atul Gawande, ‘‘The Cost Conundrum:
What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health Care,’’ New
Yorker June 1, 2009, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2009/06/01/090601fa_fact
_gawande (accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
6 Elliott S. Fisher et al., Achieving Health Care Reform—
How Physicians Can Help, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 24, 2495-97
(2009); Elliott S. Fisher & John E. Wennberg, Health Care
Quality, Geographic Variations, and the Challenge of Supply-
Sensitive Care, 46 Perspectives in Biology & Med. 1 (2003);
Francois de Brantes et al., Building a Bridge from Fragmenta-
tion to Accountability—The Prometheus Payment Model, 361
New Eng. J. Med. 11, 1033-36 (2009); Alice G. Gosfield &
James L. Reinertsen, Finding Common Cause in Quality: Con-
fronting the Physician Engagement Challenge, 34 Physician
Executive J. 2, 26 (2008); James C. Robinson and Jill M. Ye-
gian, Medical Management After Managed Care, W4 Health
Aff. 269, 269-80 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w4.269v1; see generally Comm. on Quality
Health Care in Am., The Inst. of Med., Crossing the Quality
Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century (Nat’l
Acad. Press 2001).
7 Ellyn Boukus et al., A Snapshot of U.S. Physicians: Key
Findings from the 2008 Health Tracking Study Physician Sur-
vey, Center for Studying Health System Change, Data Bulletin
No. 35 (2009) available at http://www.hschange.com/
CONTENT/1078/.
8 Codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (Public Health Service
Act amendments); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1848 et seq. (Medicare and
Medicaid adoption incentives). HITECH was included in The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 111th Cong. 1st sess. (2009), Title XIII Divi-
sion A and Title IV Division B (authorizing approximately $49
billion in funds to incentivize providers’ adoption of health in-
formation technology by ‘‘meaningful users’’ in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs).
9 Steve Shortell and Lawrence Casalino, ‘‘Health Care Re-
form Requires Accountable Care Systems,’’ JAMA 298:673-676
(July 2, 2008); Elliot Fisher et al., ‘‘Fostering Accountable
Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare,’’ Health Affairs
(web exclusive) March/April 2009; 28(2): w219-w231.
10 See, e.g., Brian Biles et al., ‘‘The Continuing Cost of Pri-
vatization: Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage Plans Jump
to $11.4 Billion in 2009.’’ The Commonwealth Fund, May 4,
2009; Brian Biles and Jonah Pozen, ‘‘Paying Medicare Private
Plans By Competitive Bidding: Not The Same As Costs In
Regular Medicare.’’ July 2009.
11 2009 Report to Congress: Improving Incentives in the
Medicare Program http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Jun09_
Ch02.pdf (accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
12 David Glass and Jeff Stensland, Accountable Care Orga-
nizations (MedPAC, Washington D.C. 2008) http://
www.medpac.gov/transcripts/0408_ACO_public_pres.pdf (ac-
cessed Feb. 25, 2010).
13 The ability to combine a fee-for-service payment method-
ology with the type of prospective budgeting that is reflected
in bundled payments potentially has been enhanced by the de-
velopment of payment tools such as Prometheus, which allow
the use of traditional payment methodologies while still per-
mitting payers to create efficiencies in how the cost of care is
budgeted and accounted for. See Francoise de Brantes,
Meredith Rosenthal, and Michael Painter, ‘‘Building a Bridge
2
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case of ACOs of sufficient size and economic strength
might be a capitation payment for a fixed group of pa-
tients, which would entail a degree of financial risk on
the part of the ACO. Whether through bundled case
payments or capitation, ACOs thus would assume more
robust responsibility for comprehensive health care. In
combination with meaningful use of health information
technology, recognition and use of ACOs presumably
could yield improvements in quality and efficiency.
Rejecting the mandatory use of ACOs, the House and
Senate bills take incremental steps to pilot ACO devel-
opment and operation, encouraging their establishment
and operation but not requiring it as a condition of par-
ticipation in public insurance programs. The House14
directs the secretary of health and human services to
undertake a Medicare ACO pilot program that can be
scaled up over time, while authorizing a similar scalable
demonstration under Medicaid. The Senate 15 autho-
rizes the use of ACOs in the context of a new Medicare
shared savings program whose development is manda-
tory on the secretary.16 (The Senate measure also ex-
pressly authorizes the establishment of a pediatric ACO
Medicaid demonstration).
Whether the focus is directly on savings (as in the
Senate bill) or on the model itself (as in the House), the
provisions in both bills aim for clinical and financial in-
tegration. Both envision the development of new types
of practice arrangements that will interact directly with
CMS rather than through an insurer-intermediary such
as a Medicare Advantage plan, thereby modernizing
CMS purchasing practices as well through expansion of
direct, value-based purchasing activities that use incen-
tives to change behavior.
Table 1 compares the elements of the House and Sen-
ate measures. There are modest differences; for ex-
ample, the Senate measure does not specifically call for
reporting results to a best practices network, nor does
the Senate bill expressly call for the testing of specific
payment models. But the two measures strongly track
each other, emphasizing the creation of a legal struc-
ture that would receive payments and make compensa-
tion, take on responsibility for care, operate through an
integrated provider network, have a demonstrable com-
mitment to quality improvement and performance re-
porting, and use health information technology.
Table 1.
House and Senate Legislative Proposals: Accountable Care Organizations
(December, 2009)
Required elements for ACO
certification
Affordable Health Care for
America Act
H.R. 3962(House)
Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act
H.R. 3590 (Senate)
Accountability for a specific patient
population in terms of quality, cost and
overall care
√ √
Specific coordination of items and ser-
vices delivered throughout the con-
tinuum of care
√ √
Investment in infrastructure and the
re-design of care processes √ √
A legal structure able to receive and
distribute payments √ √
Sufficient number of primary care physi-
cians √ √
Individual and aggregate reports on
quality measurers specified by HHS
secretary in relation to meeting annual
quality targets
√ √
Reporting of specific date to HHS sec-
retary appropriate to monitor and
evaluate ACO program
√ √
Contributions to a best-practices net-
work or website to share strategies on
quality improvement, care coordination
and efficiency mechanisms
√ X
Utilization of patient-centered pro-
cesses of care including planning and
monitoring of ongoing care manage-
ment plan
√ √
from Fragmentation to Accountability: the Prometheus Pay-
ment Model,’’ New Eng. J. Med. 361:1033-1036 (Sept. 10, 2009)
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/361/11/1033 (accessed
Feb. 25, 2010).
14 Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962
§§ 1301 et seq., 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), http://tinyurl.com/
yf5gqxl.
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590
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Table 1.
House and Senate Legislative Proposals: Accountable Care Organizations
(December, 2009)
Required elements for ACO
certification
Affordable Health Care for
America Act
H.R. 3962(House)
Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act
H.R. 3590 (Senate)
Rewards physician practices and orga-
nizational models that deliver high-
quality and efficient care
√ √
Testing of specific incentive payment
models (i.e. the performance target
and partial capitation models)
√ X
Utilization of a shared savings incentive
payment model √ √
A leadership and management struc-
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Central to both measures is the use of payment
mechanisms that are structured to promote efficiency,
curb excess volume, and spur quality. As noted, such
mechanisms might utilize a per-capita payment method
for a defined population or, alternatively, an incentive-
based fee-for-service arrangement that combines tradi-
tional procedure-based payments with performance bo-
nuses targeted at achieving desired changes in volume
and quality.
In fact, the ACO model aligns with longstanding anti-
trust policies, the aim of which has been to not stand in
the way of innovative and adequate health care finan-
cial and clinical integration arrangements. These poli-
cies, as well as the enforcement agencies’ experiences
in applying them to health care groups, offer important
insights into issues in ACO development. These anti-
trust policies also suggest important avenues for coor-
dination between CMS and the enforcement agencies to
the extent that the model proceeds forward.
Antitrust Principles and Clinical and Financial
Integration in Health Care
Achieving greater clinical and financial integration in
health care has been a central aim of U.S. antitrust
policy for nearly four decades. In Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society,17 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that efforts by nonintegrated medical care associations
to set fees charged to insurers constituted a per se re-
straint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, against which there could be no defense of quality
or efficiency. The Maricopa decision was strikingly di-
rect: in order to avoid per se liability, physician arrange-
ments involving joint negotiations with health plans
would need to be financially integrated, ‘‘analogous to
partnerships or other joint arrangements in which per-
sons who would otherwise be competitors pool their
capital and share risks of loss as well as the opportuni-
ties for profit.’’18
In 1994, in part to clarify the types of health care or-
ganizations that would be considered permissible in the
wake of Maricopa, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission (the agencies) issued State-
ments of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care
(Statements).19 Following the central holding in the
Maricopa decision, the Statements created an express
‘‘safety zone’’ for joint activities by clinical provider en-
tities that had achieved financial integration and that
were unlikely to have market power; specifically, State-
ment 820 recognizes ‘‘substantial’’ financial risk as a
‘‘reliable indicator of sufficient integration’’ so as to
render reasonably necessary joint contracting conduct
among competitors in order to achieve ‘‘significant effi-
ciencies.’’21 In other words, if the agencies concluded
that sufficient financial risk-sharing was present in a
particular provider arrangement, certain activities and
behaviors that otherwise would violate federal antitrust
law as per se illegal—including the competing provid-
ers’ joint negotiation of price with payers such as health
insurers—would be evaluated under the rule of reason
and would not be challenged by the agencies if they
lacked market power or did not result in anticompeti-
tive effects. Under a rule of reason analysis, innovative
provider arrangements would have the chance to justify
their actions by demonstrating the pro-competitive ef-
fects of the agreement as well as any proof that the joint
negotiations of price were ancillary to the creation of
certain efficiencies. A per se judgment, by contrast,
means that the activities in question have been conclu-
sively presumed to restrain competition unreasonably
even without a study of the market in which they oc-
curred or an analysis of their actual effect on competi-
tion.
Provider arrangements that fall short of financial in-
tegration do not enjoy protection under the safety
zone.22 In its original issuance of Statement 8, the FTC
made clear that the Statement 8 antitrust safety-zones
were available only for financially integrated arrange-
ments, because by definition financial integration is
likely to involve substantial incentives for efficiencies.23
However, after much criticism of the notion that, in
Maricopa’s wake, only financial integration could save
a physician group from per se illegality, the agencies re-
vised and re-issued Statement 8 in 1996. A new and ex-
panded Statement 8 identified clinical integration as an
additional means for physician groups to avoid antitrust
liability for joint negotiation of fees. Clinical integration
was a ‘‘new and controversial’’24 type of provider joint
venture that, even in the absence of significant financial
risk, could be justified under a rule of reason analysis.
Revised Statement 8 explains that where physician
clinical integration is likely to produce significant effi-
ciencies, the FTC will employ a rule of reason
analysis— but not an outright safety zone—to review
agreements on price that are reasonably necessary to
accomplish the venture’s efficiencies.25 The Statements
offered an example of this type of joint venture: an in-
dependent practice association (IPA) established with a
17 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
18 Id. at 356.
19 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care, Washington: Federal Trade Commission and U.S. De-
partment of Justice, 1996, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
20 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care, Washington: Federal Trade Commission and U.S. De-
partment of Justice, 1996, Statement 8. http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
healthcare/industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed Feb. 25,
2010).
21 Casalino L, ‘‘The Federal Trade Commission, Clinical In-
tegration, and the Organization of Physician Practice,’’ JHPPL
31:3 (June 2006) 569, 571.
22 Specifically, for protection under the safety zone, the fi-
nancially integrated physician network also must lack market
power through a showing that the network encompasses less
than 20 percent of physicians in a market (or 30 percent if the
arrangement is nonexclusive). Networks involving nonphysi-
cians, or which are clinically but not financially integrated, or
which involve a higher percentage of physicians, may also ‘‘be
legal and avoid per se condemnation, but are not in a safety
zone.
23 Thomas Rosch, commissioner, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Clinical Integration in Antitrust: Prospects for the Future,
Remarks to ABA Antitrust Section and the American Health
Lawyers Association, Sept. 17, 2007 available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070917clinic.pdf.
24 Casalino, supra note 21 at 571.
25 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care, Washington: Federal Trade Commission and U.S. De-
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paramount goal of clinical efficiency, and where the
ability to negotiate price agreements with insurers was
necessary for the venture to achieve its legitimate goals.
Thus, improving quality and efficiency as a primary
purpose of the business undertaking was framed as key
to the analysis.
Revised Statement 8 illuminates the agencies’ posi-
tion on what constitutes adequate clinical integration
such as to allow collective physician bargaining even in
the absence of significant financial risk. The agencies
stated that clinical integration typically will involve an
‘‘active and ongoing program to evaluate and modify
practice patterns by the group’s physician participants
and create a high degree of interdependence and coop-
eration among the physicians to control costs and en-
sure quality.’’26 It is important to note that the agencies
did not suggest that the above formulation was the only
way to establish clinical integration, but rather one
method they had recognized to date; indeed since the
issuance of revised Statement 8, those arrangements
that have been favorably approved are along those
lines, but the agencies left enough flexibility for other
acceptable arrangements. Revised Statement 8 offers
several examples of indicia of quality and efficiency im-
provement that in turn would justify joint contracting
conduct even in the absence of financial risk-sharing. In
essence, the revised statement recognizes conduct as a
single integrated unit as central to viability of the
model, even where full financial integration may not be
present.27
The indicia of interdependence and cooperation iden-
tified by the agencies encompassed multiple dimen-
sions including: ‘‘systems to establish goals relating to
quality and appropriate utilization of services’’; regular
evaluation of ‘‘both individual participants’ and a net-
work’s aggregate performance with respect to those
goals’’; control over practice, as evidenced by the abil-
ity to ‘‘modify individual participants’ actual practices
where necessary based on those evaluations’’; develop-
ment of practice standards and protocols ‘‘to govern
treatment and utilization of services’’; use of informa-
tion systems to gather aggregate and individual data on
cost and quality; a dimension of financial risk in the
sense of a ‘‘significant investment of capital to purchase
such systems’’; the investment of human resources in
collective quality improvement; the upward reporting
within the provider arrangement of ‘‘detailed reports on
the cost and quality of services provided, and on the
network’s success in meeting its goals’’; and a medical
director and staff capable of conducting clinical quality
improvement and performance reporting activities as
well as rate negotiations.28
Despite this notable expansion of the Statements, un-
til recently the clinical integration doctrine appears to
have had only limited impact on the way in which phy-
sicians practice; indeed, experts point out that the num-
ber of joint ventures actually has declined.29 Professor
Lawrence Casalino, who has conducted extensive re-
search into physician practice behavior (and who also
has written on ACOs) identifies a series of factors that
in his view have contributed to the low rate of clinical
integration. The first is skepticism on the part of prac-
tice groups either that their price-fixing contracts will
not be flagged or that, if examined, will meet the State-
ments’ messenger-model test,30 which does not require
clinical integration. The second is a concern that the in-
vestments necessary to achieve clinical integration
across independent practices simply is too great to jus-
tify the effort; that the financial rewards are too low;
that the willingness of payers to negotiate contracts that
lack financial risk is too limited; and that uncertainty
over the level of integration that must be achieved sim-
ply is too high. Moreover, even if an arrangement is
clinically integrated, it still can be condemned under
the rule of reason if it has market power. And the FTC
is wary of arrangements that are exclusive. Thus, pro-
viders must realize that even if they invest substantially
in a truly clinically integrated operation, if payers do
not perceive that they offer value, they cannot be forced
to deal with them on a collective basis—they can con-
tract around them in one way or another. Thus, provid-
ers have realized (or they should) that clinical integra-
tion is not a way just to get higher fees; rather, provid-
ers need to offer value and there is a risk that they
create something that no one wants to buy.
Finally, Professor Casalino points out that the prob-
lem may lie in physicians’ own sense of the health care
business: in spite of problems, the high volume of care
tolerated by the system means that independence is suf-
ficiently lucrative to offset the effort and risks that ac-
company clinical integration. Even if no direct financial
risk is involved, clinical integration (as recognized by
the antitrust agencies), requires sufficient human and
financial investment and accompanying loss of inde-
pendence over practice style to limit the appetite for
moving forward.
Commentators also have noted that even where inter-
est is high, the agencies have failed to provide suffi-
cient, broad guidance as to what clinical integration ac-
tually entails. Additionally, a group of nine senators re-
cently sent a letter to the agencies urging them to
develop more guidance on adequate clinical integration
for physicians, hospitals, and other providers.31 With-
out proper guidance and assurance from antitrust en-
forcers, providers are hesitant to attempt clinical inte-
gration arrangements for fear of antitrust sanctions. In-
26 Id.
27 It should be noted that for multi-provider networks that
include more that just physicians, Statement 9 explains that no
safety zones are available for joint activities among otherwise
competing providers. Statement 9 makes clear that a rule-of-
reason analysis will be employed by agency antitrust enforcers
to determine whether either sufficient financial or clinical inte-
gration exists within the multi-provider network to justify joint
activities, such as collective price negotiation. Statements of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Washington:
Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,
1996, Statement 9. http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
28 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission,
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care
(1996), Statement 8 (C)(1) http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/
industryguide/policy/index.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
29 Casalino, supra note 21 at 573.
30 The messenger model involves the use of an entity that
represents the physicians and avoids horizontal price-fixing
because the entity does not negotiate with health plans but
simply ‘‘messengers’’ fee proposals back-and-forth between
individual physicians and payers until individual agreements
as to price are reached.
31 Press Release, ‘‘Senators Urge Antitrust Agencies to Is-
sue Guidance on Clinical Integration, Request GAO Conduct
Studies of Current Law,’’ Health Lawyers Weekly, The Ameri-
can Health Lawyers Association, Jan. 8, 2010 Vol. VIII Issue 1.
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deed, one legal expert in health care transactions has
called for the establishment of a legislative rebuttable
presumption that would incentivize integration by pre-
sumptively recognizing the legality of health care ar-
rangements that incorporate indicia of clinical integra-
tion,32 thereby shifting the burden of proof to the en-
forcement agencies to prove inadequate clinical
integration.
FTC Advisory Opinions and Judicial Rulings
Regarding Clinical Integration
The FTC has responded to this need for certainty
through individual cases and staff advisory opinions
rather than through a further elaboration on the subject
of clinical integration in the abstract. These agency
opinions in turn are helpful in aiding understanding re-
garding what antitrust enforcers seek when they look
for evidence of clinical integration.
Arrangements That Have Received FTC Approval
In re Greater Rochester IPA (GRIPA) (2007)33
GRIPA offers an example of a clinically integrated
physician arrangement that successfully met the FTC’s
standard as set forth in the revised 1996 Statements.
GRIPA positioned its venture as one offering a new
health care product that would combine clinical prac-
tice with an integrated clinical improvement program
designed to improve the quality of care and create effi-
ciencies in the practice of medicine. GRIPA claimed
that this new product would be ‘‘intertwined’’ with its
proposed joint contracting practices with payers (health
insurance companies) on behalf of its 500 independent
and hospital-affiliated primary care physicians and spe-
cialists in practice across 40 separate areas. The FTC
agreed that collective bargaining was reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the program’s likely efficiencies.34
According to the FTC, GRIPA possessed certain key
indicia of clinical integration: (1) a seamless, collabora-
tive network of primary and specialty care physicians
who agree to refer patients to one another for care; (2)
facilitation of collaboration among GRIPA’s physicians
through benchmarks, protocols, and performance and
compliance monitoring; (3) the use of a web-based,
electronic information sharing system that would per-
mit GRIPA physicians to share clinical information re-
lated to their common patients, order prescriptions and
lab tests, and gain system-wide access to patient infor-
mation, including information held in hospitals
throughout the community; (4) the expansion of care
management services to additional long term and
chronic health conditions; (5) measurable up-front fi-
nancial investment, calculated at several thousand dol-
lars per physician as well as ongoing practice costs; and
(6) a solid calculation of savings attributable to the ex-
pected efficiencies.35
Reflecting the revised 1996 Statement 8 requirement
that any collective bargaining over price must be rea-
sonably necessary to achieve the stated efficiencies of
the proposed clinically integrated arrangement, GRIPA,
in the FTC’s view, was able to justify its price negotia-
tion activities because the entity (1) created an easily
identifiable network of providers and referring physi-
cians; (2) reinforced the internal referral system; (3) en-
sured the presence of common financial goals among
physicians; (4) increased collaboration opportunities;
(5) demonstrated its ability to sanction nonperforming
physicians; (6) showed a major financial investment; (7)
significantly reduced administrative costs and burdens;
and (8) could achieve its efficiency aims only through
real clinical integration.36
An important dimension of the review focused on the
fact that GRIPA was ‘‘non-exclusive,’’ so that there was
no impediment to health plans that wished to contract
directly with physicians and not deal with GRIPA at all.
The GRIPA opinion also marked the first time FTC ex-
plicitly acknowledged that a clinical integration pro-
gram could legitimately result in higher fee schedules if
the program reduced utilization, improved quality, and
ultimately delivered greater ‘‘value.’’
In re MedSouth (2002 and 2007)
In re MedSouth offers an important example of a pro-
posed joint contracting activity that was initially ap-
proved and then evaluated after it was operational. In
2002, MedSouth received FTC approval37 after propos-
ing to create a new arrangement that combined nonex-
clusive joint contracting with a web-based data system
that allowed participating physicians to share clinical
information about their patients. The MedSouth joint
venture also reflected several recognized indicia of
clinical integration: (1) a requirement that its physi-
cians comply with agreed-upon protocols; (2) active
monitoring of compliance; (3) a system to compare phy-
sician performance to established network benchmarks
and institute corrective action programs for deficient
performance; and (4) the ability to expel from the net-
work those physicians who could not or would not com-
ply with the program’s requirements.38
In its 2002 approval of the MedSouth program, the
FTC noted two primary reasons why joint contracting
appeared to be reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-
gram’s stated efficiency goals. First, the FTC deter-
mined that the ultimate success of the new arrangement
could not be attained if each physician separately con-
tracted with payers, because there would be no guaran-
tee of full participation by all the program’s members.
Second, the FTC found that the joint contracting en-
abled the program to allocate returns to individual phy-
sicians thus providing monetary incentives for the phy-
sicians to invest the required time and effort in the pro-
gram.39 The FTC stated in its 2002 advisory opinion that
the agency would not seek enforcement action against
MedSouth, but that the agency would revisit Med-
32 Hastings D, ‘‘Addressing the Legal Issues in Achieving
Quality and Cost Efficiency: The Need for A Rebuttable Pre-
sumption,’’ BNA’s Health Law Reporter 18:740 (June 5, 2009).
33 Federal Trade Commission, In re Greater Rochester In-
dependent Practice Association Advisory Opinion (2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm
(accessed Feb. 25, 2010).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. See also Simon D. et al., ‘‘Clinical Integration: a Guide
to Working with the Federal Trade Commission to Enhance
Care Through Pro-Patient, Pro-Innovation, Pro-Efficiency Pro-
vider Networks,’’ Health Lawyers Weekly, The American
Health Lawyers Association, Jan. 30, 2009 Vol. VII Issue 4.
37 Federal Trade Commission, In re MedSouth, Inc. Advi-
sory Opinion (2002 and 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
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South’s effect on competition and its success in achiev-
ing efficiencies at a later date.
In keeping its promise, a subsequent 2007 FTC re-
evaluation of the MedSouth program led to a new advi-
sory letter noting a significant decline in the number of
participating physicians, which in turn limited the ben-
efit of a comprehensive multi-specialty network; the ab-
sence of appropriate health information privacy and se-
curity safeguards; the absence of a sufficiently strong
mechanism for monitoring and enforcing practice stan-
dards; and the lack of evidence that payers were getting
value for their investment, that is, were deriving suffi-
cient benefits of clinical integration to justify the con-
tract price. Nonetheless, the FTC continued its approval
of joint nonrisk contracting as necessary to achieve
clinical efficiency. This is significant because the ability
to maintain the joint contracting aspect of the clinical
integration arrangement is critical both in terms of
achieving the claimed efficiencies as well as providing
the physicians greater bargaining power with payers.
In re TriState Health Partners Inc., April 13, 2009
(TriState)40
In re Tristate offers a particularly noteworthy ex-
ample of an FTC staff approval of a clinical integration
model, because of the breadth of the FTC reasoning re-
garding the potential of a model to achieve efficiencies
sufficient to justify joint contracting without financial
risk. TriState is a physician-hospital organization that
includes a hospital and 212 physicians, both primary
care and specialists. Its proposed program purports to
‘‘offer payers a network of primary care and specialist
physicians whose services will be integrated through a
formal and stringent medical management program
that includes protocol development and implementa-
tion, performance reporting, procedures for corrective
action when necessary, and aggressive management of
high-cost, high-risk patients.’’41 Physicians seeking to
participate in the program must become members of
TriState through an application, credentialing process,
and a $2,500 joining fee. Member physicians must par-
ticipate in all TriState payer contracts, but also may
contract independently with insurers directly.
In order to justify its collective bargaining of price,
TriState described several specific aspects of its clinical
integration program: (1) compulsory participation in all
medical management programs, service on clinical
committees, and sharing of best practice ideas and
methods; (2) a requirement that physicians refer pa-
tients to network providers when medically appropri-
ate; (3) use of a web-based HIT system that can identify
high-risk and high-cost patients and can facilitate the
exchange of patients’ treatment and medical manage-
ment information; (4) the development of 18 clinical
practice guidelines with 30 more under development
and the monitoring of adherence to these guidelines; (5)
the use of specific software to manage and track ‘‘epi-
sodes of care’’ in order to determine where perfor-
mance improvement will have the greatest quality and
financial benefits; (6) the monitoring of physician per-
formance against peer, regional, and national bench-
marks; and (7) a program of education, discipline, and
expulsion from the program for noncompliant physi-
cians.42
In its advisory opinion, the FTC identified several fac-
tors to be used when analyzing whether a proposed in-
tegration plan is likely to achieve significant efficiencies
that justify joint contracting.43
s Factor #1: Is the program selective in choosing
network physicians who are likely to further the
program’s efficiency objectives? The FTC noted
that while not initially selective (any physician can
join), there did exist a number of conditions of par-
ticipation that would effectively discourage those
not fully committed.
s Factor #2: Are the participating physicians invest-
ing both monetary and human capital into the
program? The FTC determined that while the
$2,500 entry fee was too low to ‘‘strongly moti-
vate’’ physicians to work toward the success of the
program, the human capital in terms of time and
effort did evidence a substantial degree of commit-
ment to the program.
s Factor #3: Will the structural and operational ele-
ments of the program foster significantly increased
interaction among the participating physicians in
the treatment of patients? Here, the FTC noted the
emphasis on clinical practice guidelines and
evidence-based standards, an in-network referral
policy, the use of HIT, the collection and use of
performance data, a requirement that all physi-
cians participate in all aspects of the program, and
performance feedback mechanisms that carried
enforceability consequences.
s Factor #4: Is there adequate information regarding
how the program will be evaluated over time? Al-
though this element appeared to be lacking in
TriState’s program, the FTC recognized the past
success of a similar pilot program offered by Tri-
State as predictive.
s Factor #5: Does the participation of the hospital
create an inherent conflict in terms of the hospi-
tal’s need to fill beds? The FTC determined under
the facts presented, and because of Maryland’s
unique all-payer hospital rate regulation system,
the hospital did not have an incentive to provide
excess services. The program’s medical manage-
ment processes, in the opinion of the FTC, were
strong enough to overcome any potential conflicts
of interest.
TriState is noteworthy in that it received a favorable
review notwithstanding relatively small financial invest-
ments from its existing physician members, lax initial
membership requirements, little detail regarding how it
intended to improve physician performance, the ab-
sence of financial incentives, and substantial market
shares of both the physicians, and the hospital. The
TriState opinion also was the first favorable review of a
physician-hospital organization clinical integration pro-
gram, which can be viewed as the probable forerunner
to ACOs that form around hospitals.
In its analysis, however, the FTC found that
TriState’s program was likely to produce its claimed ef-
40 Federal Trade Commission, In re TriState Health Part-
ners Inc. Advisory Letter (2009) http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm (accessed Feb. 25,
2010). See also Johnson C, ‘‘Federal Trade Commission Issues
New Advisory Opinion Approving Joint Contracting for Clini-
cally Integrated PHO,’’ Health Lawyers Weekly, The American
Health Lawyers Association, May 22, 2009 Vol. VII Issue 20.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Johnson C., supra note 40.
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ficiencies. The next stage of the inquiry focused on
whether the joint contracting portion of the program
was reasonably necessary to achieve these efficiencies.
Concluding that the joint contracting was indeed neces-
sary, the agency identified several important consider-
ations: the link between the program’s success and uni-
versal participation among physicians in all contracts
under the same criteria and protocols; an in-network re-
ferral policy reinforced through joint contracting; in-
centivization of physician participation through a
greater number of contracts; the existence of econo-
mies of scale; branding through a single entity; and a
reduction in administrative overhead.44
Arrangements Rejected by the FTC and the Courts
In re Suburban Health Organization Inc. (SHO)45
In re Suburban Health Organization offers an ex-
ample of a clinical integration arrangement that did not
pass muster with the FTC. SHO was a proposed pro-
gram of partial integration among several hospitals and
their employed primary care physicians. Under the joint
contracting element, SHO negotiated the rates of pri-
mary care physician services on behalf of its members,
and such negotiations were the exclusive means
through which payers could gain access to those ser-
vices. SHO’s proposed clinical integration consisted of:
(1) medical management activities that included patient
monitoring and adoption of practice guidelines and pro-
tocols for preventative care as well as four other spe-
cific conditions; (2) quality management programs de-
signed to measure physician compliance and identify
opportunities for improvement using web-based tech-
nology; (3) the distribution of educational materials to
physicians and staff; and (4) an incentive program in-
tended to encourage physician compliance with pro-
gram requirements through a bonus equal to five per-
cent of their compensation for meeting quality manage-
ment targets.
The FTC staff opinion rejected SHO’s clinical integra-
tion program, stating that joint contracting was not rea-
sonably necessary to achieve program efficiencies. The
deficiencies in the arrangement that were identified by
the FTC are noteworthy. First, the FTC could find no
evidence to explain why several hospitals needed to be
involved in the integration and concluded that a hospi-
tal could reap the same benefits by implementing the
program independently. Second, the model showed too
much reliance on hospitals to track, reward, and disci-
pline the physicians for noncompliance, and there was
no mechanism for disciplining hospitals for their failure
to monitor performance. Third, the FTC found little evi-
dence of interdependence among physicians in the pro-
vision of coordinated care. Fourth, the FTC found inclu-
sion of too few diseases and medical diagnoses. Fifth,
the lack of specialists in the program limited the ben-
efits in terms of treatment. Finally, the FTC found im-
plausible SHO’s claim that the program would track the
effectiveness of referrals to nonparticipating specialists.
SHO’s lack of adequate clinical integration led the
FTC to determine that the joint contracting by the phy-
sicians was indeed problematic under antitrust law be-
cause it did not appear necessary to achieve any effi-
ciencies in the provision of care. Specifically, the FTC
stated ‘‘it is not evident, and SHO provides no explana-
tion, why agreement on the entire schedule of fees to be
charged for all medical services performed by the em-
ployed primary care physicians in SHO is necessary to
implement a program that only addresses treatment of
a very limited subset of medical conditions treated by
those physicians.’’46 Because there was such limited
primary/specialty interdependence, such heavy reliance
on a nonenforceable monitoring system, and so little in
the way of a mechanism for transforming the provision
of care for a broad array of conditions, joint contracting
without financial integration could not be justified
against the efficiencies to be achieved. An important as-
pect of the case in the view of Robert Leibenluft, former
assistant director for health care of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Bureau of Competition, was that the phy-
sicians all were employed by their respective hospitals;
thus, hospitals could have exercised greater control
over practice quality and efficiency from the outset,
thereby obviating the need for a broader clinical inte-
gration program that would allow joint negotiations
across facilities.
North Texas Specialty Physicians v. FTC (North Texas)
A widely watched judicial ruling was North Texas
Specialty Physicians v. FTC,47 which flowed from a de-
nial. Both the FTC and the courts rejected this nonrisk
joint contracting proposal precisely because it lacked
sufficiently robust indicia of clinical integration to merit
the anti-competitive effects of collective bargaining. In
North Texas, physicians formed an IPA, which then car-
ried out rate negotiations on behalf of its members. The
IPA failed to consult with individual members regard-
ing the prices they would accept, instead simply trans-
mitting to its members the rates that it had agreed to
collectively. At the same time, the IPA failed to engage
in the types of clinical integration practices that might
have justified and indeed necessitated its joint contract-
ing practices.
In affirming a unanimous FTC decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
IPA’s collective bargaining was not reasonably neces-
sary to achieve any efficiency-enhancing integration
and thus constituted illegal price-fixing.48 Other than
shared investment and joint contracting, the IPA lacked
the types of transformative elements identified in the
Statements and in the FTC advisory letters that necessi-
tate joint contracting; indeed, the entity lacked the indi-
cia that would necessitate the type of collective negotia-
tion that the FTC views as essential to enabling clinical
integration.49
In re Alta Bates50
Similarly, in June 2009, the FTC announced a pro-
posed consent order aimed at settling a dispute involv-
ing the Alta Bates Medical Group, which stood accused
of illegal price fixing in connection with contracts in the
San Francisco area. As with North Texas, the FTC de-
termined that the 600-member IPA had negotiated col-
44 Id.
45 Federal Trade Commission, In re Suburban Health Orga-
nization Inc. Advisory Opinion (2006) http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
healthcare/industryguide/advisory.htm (accessed Feb. 25,
2010).
46 Id.
47 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 In re Alta Bates Medical Group, Inc. FTC, No. 051 0260,
settlement announced June 4, 2009.
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lectively for years without following the messenger
model requirement of consultation with individual phy-
sicians and without adopting the all-important indicia
of clinical integration that would justify a collective ap-
proach to the negotiation process rather than the use of
individual consultation procedures.51
Table 2, below, presents the key indicia of clinical
integration—apart from evidence of financial integra-
tion through the acceptance of significant financial
risk—identified by the FTC in its advisory opinion let-
ters. As in the Statements, a favorable finding funda-
mentally rests on a basic commitment to measurable
human and financial investments in quality and effi-
ciency improvements as measured by evidence of col-
lective financial and operational practice, performance
accountability, a strong commitment to changing prac-
tice for patients across a wide array of health condi-
tions, performance measurement, the use of health in-
formation broadly, and a greater commitment to infor-
mation transparency.
Taken together, the decisions rest on a crucial find-
ing by the enforcement agencies: sufficient evidence of
collective and interdependent efforts to create the po-
tential for significant efficiencies—such as higher qual-
ity, better use of cost effective care, and more value—
that go beyond what likely would have been achieved
independently and that justify the anticompetitive re-
straints (including joint negotiation with payers) that
are reasonably necessary to achieve those efficiencies.
Table 2 shows the indicia and characteristics that are
common to the cases and that help guide the agencies
in their review of conduct.
Table 2.
Indicia of Clinical Integration that Justify












Adequate number of diagnoses and dis-
eases covered by clinical integration √ √ X √
Agreement by physicians to refer in-
network √ √ X √
Both specialists and primary care phy-
sicians in network √ √ X √
Financial investment by physicians √ √ X √
Human resource investment by physi-
cians √ √ X √
Technology that enables multiple physi-
cians to gain access to and share pa-
tient information
√ √ X √
Streamlined recordkeeping and opera-
tions, including the use of electronic
lab orders and prescriptions
√ √ X √
Enforceable performance standards
and a demonstrated capacity to en-
force the standards through adequate
staffing
√ √ X √
A nonexclusive arrangement √ √ X √
Joint contracting that aligns with a
broad array of conditions and diag-
noses subject to clinical integration
performance measurement and im-
provement
√ √ X √
Upward reporting of results, in terms of
both aggregate and individual physician
performance
√ √ X √
Source: modification of table developed by Simon et al. in Clinical Integration: a Guide to Working with the Federal Trade
Commission to Enhance Care Through Pro-Patient, Pro-Innovation, Pro-Efficiency Provider Networks, Health Lawyers Weekly,
The American Health Lawyers Association, Jan. 30, 2009 Vol. VII Issue 4.
51 Id.
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Interaction of Accountable Care Organization and
Antitrust Enforcement Policy
A comparison of ACO characteristics and those used
by the FTC to determine whether the goal of clinical in-
tegration has been met to a degree sufficient to justify
collective financial negotiation shows a high degree of
concordance. This degree of concordance would be
even more so in ACO models that employ both clinical
integration and financing arrangements that rely on
population-based capitation and use of a salary-plus-
performance-bonus payment system. In this case, an
ACO appears to attain the level of financial integration
expressly recognized for purposes of safety-zone treat-
ment.
At their heart, both the ACO model and the FTC cri-
teria demand the existence of a structure dedicated to
quality and efficiency and possessing both the mission
and the authority to impose practice, reporting, and
compensation standards (including penalties and re-
wards) across a group of physicians on behalf of the pa-
tient population. Particular emphasis in both models is
placed on the formation of large practice groups that
take responsibility for a group of patients and that
adopt an approach to practice that achieves integration
as measured by adherence to quality protocols and per-
formance measurement, the exchange of information,
and the reporting of outcomes. In both models, the
group ultimately comes to operate as one, facing the
risks and enjoying the rewards (whether in the form of
profit sharing or performance bonuses) of efficiency
and quality. Furthermore, in both cases, the organiza-
tional model can exist without regard to whether the
model assumes significant financial risk, although even
where only clinical integration is present, the agencies
will look for evidence that the participants recognize
the entity as a common enterprise, as revealed through
the investment of financial and sweat equity.
The parallels between ACOs and the FTC/DOJ anti-
trust guidelines and opinions suggest the value of fur-
ther coordination between HHS and DOJ/FTC in the
event that the ACO provisions in the health reform leg-
islation become law. The central question becomes
whether, and under what circumstances, entities that
are certified as ACOs would be treated as falling within
the parameters established by the FTC and DOJ. Where
an ACO achieves financial as well as clinical integration
through use of capitation or other global payment
mechanisms that underlie the acceptance of financial
risk, one might anticipate that the entity also would re-
ceive a Statement 8 safety zone assuming that other
considerations such as market share are satisfied.
The additional question is how to treat ACOs that re-
ceive Medicare certification but that are not considered
financially integrated within the meaning of the State-
ments because of the absence of a capitation or global
payment system that supports clinical integration ac-
tivities. In this case, one option might be the develop-
ment of a presumptive approval standard; that is, a less
rigorous review than what might be needed under a
‘‘rule of reason’’ test and that (assuming market size
considerations are satisfied) treats the CMS certifica-
tion as evidence of integration at a level sufficient to
meet the expectations of the enforcement agencies.
The benefit of this type of presumptive approval
would be an added inducement in ACO formation, since
the entity, once formed, could conduct business in other
payer markets and thus grow its presence in such mar-
ket. Once fully certified and operating as a fully clini-
cally and financially integrated entity, an ACO presum-
ably should be able to negotiate with private payers
from this position of clinical integration, although is-
sues of market power still will bear careful scrutiny.
This additional level of coordination between CMS and
the enforcement agencies would mean that as CMS
moves to use its Medicare certification and payment
powers to influence the rate of clinical and financial in-
tegration, entities coming under the CMS umbrella
would be further positioned to negotiate similar terms
with other payers in the employer market and the new
exchange, and in expanded Medicaid markets that are
the anticipated product of national health reform. This
added market reach would, in turn, spur the reach of
health information technology, integrated clinical prac-
tice, and efficiency strategies further into the patient
population.
What is clear is that there is the potential for policy
synergy between emerging federal ACO policy on the
one hand and antitrust policy on the other. How the fed-
eral government coordinates these policy levers to pro-
duce a greater push toward integration, technology-
enabled health care, quality improvement, and the pro-
duction of comprehensive health information, should
be counted as one of the most closely watched
follow-on activities of national health reform.
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